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THE TRANSFEREE JUDGE -THE UNSUNG HERO OF
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
John T. McDermott*
The creation in 19681 of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation marked the beginning of a new approach to the control and
management of federal multi-party multidistrict litigation.2 For the
past five years nearly all complex federal litigation has been coordin-
ated by the Panel.3 Unlike its predecessor, the Coordinating Committee
for Multiple Litigation,4 the Panel does not direct the processing of
multidistrict litigation; it simply "collects" the related cases for transfer
to a single federal district court and assignment to a single federal
judge-the transferee judge.5 Although the transferee judge may receive
assistance from the Panel staff6 or from depositions judges appointed
by the Panel, he is solely responsible for processing all cases from the
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law, formerly
Executive Attorney to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and Execu-
tive Editor of the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation.
'The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation was established in June, 1968, fol-
lowing the enactment of the Multidistrict Litigation Act, now 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(1970). The Panel is composed of seven federal circuit and district judges who meet
at least once a month to review multidistrict litigation and to hear arguments in
pending matters. The Panel's permanent staff is located in Washington, D.C. For
a further discussion of the establishment and organization of the Panel, see Peterson
and McDermott, Multidistrict Litigation:New Forms of Judicial Administration, 56
A.B.A.J. 737 (1970). For a short primer on practices before the Panel, see, McDer-
mott, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 57 F.R.D. 215 (1973).
sThe Panel has jurisdiction over litigation where "civil actions involving one or more
common questions of fact are pending in different districts." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)
(1970).
sDuring the 1968-72 period nearly 2,400 cases were transferred by the Panel under
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1970). While this is less than 1 percent of the civil actions
filed in federal district courts during the same period, it includes nearly half of the
private treble damage actions filed during the period and a very substantial per-
centage of the other types of typically complex federal litigation: common disaster
(air crash), stock fraud, and patent infringement cases.
'The Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United States District
Courts was established by Chief Justice Earl Warren in January, 1962, in response
to the nearly 2,000 separate private treble damage antitrust suits filed against the
electrical equipment manufacturers in the early 1960's. For a brief review of the
work of the Coordinating Committee, see Neal and Goldberg, The Electrical Equip-
ment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621 (1964). For
a comprehensive analysis of this litigation, see Bane, The Electrical Equipment
Conspiracies: The Treble Damage Actions (Federal Legal Publications 1973).
"The jurisdiction of the Panel is principally limited to the transfer of related cases
to a single district "for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings", their
assignment to a single district judge, the appointment of deposition judges to assist
the transferee judge, and finally the remand of the transferred cases "at or before
the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was trans-
ferred unless it shall have been previously terminated." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a),(b)(1970). The Panel does hold regular conferences for transferee judges at which
matters of mutual interest are discussed, but neither the Panel nor its staff attempts
to direct the actual progress of a group of cases transferred under § 1407.
6The Panel does encourage transferee judges to avail themselves of the clerical and
legal services offered by the Panel's small staff.
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time they are assigned to him until they are remanded or reassigned
by the Panel.7
Many of the problems encountered by transferee judges are neither
new nor unique to multidistrict litigation, but may be magnified because
of the number of parties involved.8 Transferee judges have had to
resolve such diverse legal questions as the validity of service of process
under a typical state long arm statute9 and the right of a foreign gov-
ernment to maintain a suit for treble damages under the federal anti-
trust laws.' 0 There are also several kinds of problems unique to multi-
district litigation and others which although not unique to multidistrict
litigation are rather common in such cases." This article attempts to
identify some of these relatively unique problems and to discuss the
solutions developed by the transferee judges themselves.
LIAISON COUNSEL
The Manual for Complex Litigation 12 strongly recommends that liai-
son counsel be appointed in all complex multiparty litigation 3 and
most transferee judges have found it desirable to appoint one or more
liaison counsel for their cases. Appointment and compensation of liaison
counsel can create serious problems.
The duties of liaison counsel, as distinct from lead counsel, involve
such primarily administrative functions as the reproduction and distri-
bution of court orders and notices. When his duties are limited to
ministerial tasks of this sort, selecting liaison counsel is relatively easy
although compensation or reimbursement may present a problem. Even
where his duties are strictly administrative however, the appointment
of a local attorney as liaison counsel by a transferee judge sometimes
causes bad feelings among out-of-state attorneys who may feel that
the transferee judge would prefer to deal with the local bar rather than
'On two occasions--both at the request of the transferee judges-the Panel has re-
assigned all or part of the cases to another judge. See, for example, In re Antibiotic
Drug Cases, 320 F. Supp. 586 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
8One group of multidistrict litigation may include hundreds of actual plaintiffs and
ten or more major defendants. If class actions are involved, the parties may number
in the millions.
9 Miller v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Ky. 1969); In re
Puerto Rico Air Disaster Litigation, 340 F. Supp. 492 (D. P.R. 1972). Some unique
"venue" problems have also arisen. For example, a third party defendant in a trans-
ferred case must be served in the transferee district; service in the transferor dis-
trict is ineffective. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. LeMay, 448 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1971).
"In re Antibiotic Drug Antitrust Litigation, 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
UAlthough transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970) usually eliminates the need for
federal judges to coordinate related cases, it is still sometimes necessary for the
transferee judge to informally coordinate federal proceedings with those occurring
in related state court actions. See In re Texas Gulf Sulphur Securities Litigation,
344 F. Supp. 1398 (J.P.M.L. 1972) and In re Hendersonville Air Disaster Litigation,
297 F. Supp. 1039 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
"Formerly The Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation [hereinafter referred
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with them.' 4 At least one transferee judge15 has attempted to dispel
this atmosphere of partiality by appointing co-liaison counsel, one from
Boston and the other from New York City where most of the transferred
cases originated. Another appointed a committee of 3 attorneys (the
"Troika") selected by counsel for all plaintiffs to expedite discovery. 16
However, a more difficult problem results because many liaison
counsel end up serving as lead counsel. Since liaison counsel frequently
is responsible for coordinating the filing of pleadings and other papers
for his liaison group, he may take it upon himself to prepare the pre-
liminary draft of all pleadings, answers, responses, and discovery re-
quests for his group. In some multidistrict litigation all counsel collabor-
ate to prepare pleadings, motions, etc., but where there are a large
number of attorneys involved, committees may be established to handle
the different aspects of pretrial. When all counsel participate more
or less equally in the pretrial process and each accepts his proportionate
share of the work, there is seldom any problem with compensation of
liaison counsel. He may be reimbursed, on a pro-rata share, but will
not be entitled to legal fees for he will have done no more legal work
than the other attorneys in his group. However, many times the liaison
counsel actually does all the legal work for his group either with or
without the approval or consent of the court or the attorneys within
the liaison group.
The transformation from liaison counsel to lead counsel may occur
because the attorney actively attempts to dominate the litigation, but
more often it happens because the other attorneys are willing to sit
back and let liaison counsel do all the work. This situation would
probably not create any problems for the transferee court 7 except that
liaison counsel, quite naturally, will expect to be compensated for the
legal work he has done for the entire group.' 8
"Although most local federal court rules require the appearance of local counsel in all
cases, the rule is generally waived in multidistrict litigation being processed under
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
"Chief Judge Andrew A. Caffrey of the District of Massachusetts in the Revenue
Properties Litigation.
"Judge Charles Metzner of the Southern District of New York in the Protection De-
vice Cases. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
"Actually, such a development usually makes it easier for the transferee judge to
schedule and conduct pretrial conferences because fewer lawyers attend and partici-
pate.
'This type of transformation occurred in the Cincinnati, Ohio, Air Disaster Litigation
(TWA). Judge MacSwinford of the Eastern District of Kentucky held a pretrial
conference to discuss the matter of fees for liaison counsel and, following the hearing,
made the following findings: "Liaison counsel advised in open court that they have
done more than merely perform the administrative duties enumerated in Pretrial Order
No. 1. They allege, for example, that they have prepared, initially for circulation to
all plaintiffs' counsel, but eventually for service on the defendants, extensive inter-
rogatories, motions for production of documents, and request for admissions. These
documents are part of the record in this multidistrict litigation as are the objections
to them filed by the defendants. The greatest part of the recent pretrial conference
was devoted to these motions and objections.
1974]
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The reimbursement of liaison counsel for out-of-pocket expenses
(such as costs of reproducing and mailing notices, etc.) and for legal
services (such as the preparation of papers, motions, etc.) became a
serious problem in several groups of multidistrict litigation. Transferee
judges have sometimes mistakenly assumed that the attorneys would
work out this problem among themselves and that judicial supervision
would not be necessary. Such an approach can lead to a serious problem
at the close of the litigation when, due to settlements and dismissals,
the court no longer has all parties before it and liaison counsel is seeking
reimbursement from all counsel in the group he represents. Several un-
fortunate instances of this type have convinced some transferee judges
that specific arrangements for the compensation of liaison counsel must
be made when counsel is first appointed.
Transferee judges have developed their own methoods for han-
dling these problems. For example, Judge Swinford of the Eastern
District of Kentucky, the transferee judge in two groups of air crash
cases 19 merely provided that no settled case would be dismissed unless
the settlement order was approved by liaison counsel thereby insuring
that a satisfactory arrangement for his compensation had been made
between him and plaintiff's counsel. This procedure worked quite satis-
factorily; at no time did counsel have to come before the court to settle
disagreements about fair compensation for liaison counsel's services. A
problem did arise when counsel for certain plaintiffs sought dismissal
from the transferor court20 without receiving the consent of liaison
counsel. This problem was resolved by having the transferor judge
vacate his dismissal order and insist that counsel follow the procedures estab-
lished by the transferee judge.
Judge Hubert Will, the transferee judge in the Butterfield Patent
Cases, took a different approach and required liaison counsel to submit
a statement of their expenses and charges periodically to the court.
A hearing was then held to determine the fairness of these charges
'While liaison counsel's efforts in this regard are clearly beyond those required
by this Court in its initial pretrial order, they are neither improper nor unexpected.
Someone must take the lead in coordinating plaintiffs' discovery, and it is logical that
this responsibility should be assumed by court-designated liaison counsel.
"All these services of liaison counsel were and are valuable to all plaintiffs.
All these services were accepted by all plaintiffs. They were rendered and accepted
with either the express or implied approval of all plaintiffs.
'The Court is convinced that these efforts benefit all plaintiffs regardless of
whether or not their action eventually goes to trial and the results of the discovery
actually used. All plaintiffs accepting these services are obligated to pay the reason-
able value thereof, including a fair share of expenses paid or incurred in rendering
said services. ' '
'1In re Air Crash Disaster at the Greater Cincinnati Airport (American Airlines Crash),
295 F. Supp. 51 (J.P.M.L. 1968); In re Air Crash Disaster at the Greater Cincinnati
Airport, (TWA Crash), 298 F. Supp. 358 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
"It is clear that transferor courts have no authority to enter any orders or take any
action in transferred cases until they have been remanded by the Panel. In re
Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 496 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
[Vol. 35
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and if approved, the court directed the parties within the liaison group
to reimburse the liaison counsel for their share of the costs. The ad-
vantage of Judge Will's procedure is that it permits a contemporanious
review of liaison counsel's work and charges. Postponing reimbursement
of liaison counsel until the cases are settled may result in objections
to the fees when little if anything can be done to reduce the expenses.
CLASS ACTIONS
Although class actions are not unique to multidistrict litigation and
not all multidistrict litigation includes class actions, it seems that class
actions have become an almost commonplace aspect of multidistrict
litigation.21 Class actions have been filed in virtually every type of
multidistrict litigation22 and even where class actions status has been
denied, some courts have proceeded in a quasi-class action style.23 Since
multidistrict litigation necessarily involves multiple parties and common
questions of law, the basic criteria of Rule 23 (numerosity and common
questions of law or fact) are usually present and the establishment of
class actions in multidistrict litigation is not usually on these grounds.
There have been several major problems which have challenged
the ingenuity and resourcefulness of many transferee judges with regard
to the management of class actions: (1) competing class action claims,
(2) notice, and (3) attorney fees. Transferee judges have made signif-
icant contributions to the resolution of these problems.24
A. COMPETING CLASS ACTIONS
Class actions "compete" when similarly situated parties have filed
actions purporting to represent the same, similar, or overlapping classes.
LOne student commentator has pointed out that almost half (22 or 53) of all trans-
ferred multidistrict litigation involves class action claims. Comment, The Experience
of Transferee Courts Under the Multidistrict Litigation Act, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 588
(1972). Indeed, the existence of conflicting class action claims may be a compelling
reason for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970). See, for example, In re Texas
Gulf Sulphur Securities Litigation, supra note 11.
"In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 55 F.R.D. 269 (D.D.C. 1972) [state-wide con-
sumer classes and national hospital and drug store classes established] ; In re Penn
Central Securities Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1343-1345 (E.D.Pa. 1972) [several
stockholder classes established]; Petition of Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D.Cal. 1972)
[plaintiffs' class established in air crash litigation].
2Although establishment of a plaintiffs' class was initially denied in the Hanover,
New Hampshire, Air Disaster Litigation, Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D.
76 (E.D.Pa. 1970), the transferee judge planned to try the issue of liability "in the
same manner as a class action." In re Hanover, New Hampshire, Air Crash Litiga-
tion, 342 F. Supp. 907 (D.N.H. 1971).
2
'While limiting this discussion to the contributions of transferee judges in multi-
district class action litigation, it goes almost without saying that other judges have
made equally valuable contributions in these areas. See, for example, Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973) [class
'' notice " I and " I floating class recovery" 1] ; Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) and LaSala v. American Savings & Loan Assn., 489 P.2d 113 (Calif. 1971)
[protection of absent class]; TWA v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 93 S.Ct. 647 (1973)
[attorney fees and costs].
19741
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There are three basic solutions to this problem: 1) one of the potential
class action representatives can be selected to represent the entire class
and those not selected may either choose to be included in the class
or to opt out and maintain their individual actions; 2) the competing
cases can be consolidated and all potential class action representatives
named joint representative parties with their attorneys serving as a
committee of counsel for the class; and 3) the class can be subdivided
so that each potential class action representative (and his attorney)
represents a portion of the entire class.
All three techniques have been successfully used by transferee
judges. In the Revenue Properties Litigation Judge Caffrey subdivided
the class by types of claims. Most of the plaintiffs who originally filed
class actions were selected to represent one of the subclasses.2 5 In the
Antibiotic Drug Litigation Judge Inzer B. Wyatt of the Southern Dis-
trict of New York used consolidated classes in the wholesaler-retailer
cases and in the hospital cases, and appointed a committee of counsel
to represent the absent class members composed of all counsel who had
brought class actions. In the "litigating" Antibiotic Drug Cases Judge
Miles Lord of the District of Minnesota chose one of several potential
class representatives to represent several "farm classes" of antibiotic
users, but all attorneys were permitted to become members of a "com-
mitte of counsel" which was to assist the attorney for the class represent-
atives.
Each of the three approaches has advantages and limitations. Where
the class can rationally be subdivided into subclasses which have con-
flicting or potentially antagonistic interests, it is not only feasible, but
desirable, to divide the class into subclasses and to select different
representatives and attorneys for each subclass. As in the Revenue
Properties Litigation, supra, this procedure protects the separate interests
of each of the subclasses. However, where the potential conflict between
class members is more illusory than real, the establishment of subclasses
may be suggested anyway to accommodate the potential representative
plaintiffs and their attorneys; establishing subclasses with separate
representation under such circumstances is generally undesirable for it
increases costs 26 and attorney fees, 27 both of which reduce the actual
recovery.
2The subclasses were not established artificially as is evidenced by the fact that dif-
ferent settlements were made with different classes. In approving each of the settle-
ments, Judge MacCaffrey pointed out that the attorneys for the various classes "con-
ferred at very great length and have produced an agreement which initially evaluates
the probability of success among the various classes . . . [and] worked out by mutual
agreement a formula which provides for distribution to the various classes of claim-
ants in proportion to their likelihood of success on the merits." In re Revenue Prop-
erties Co., Ltd. (D-Mass. 1972).
mFor example, separate notices will generally be required for each subclass thereby
increasing publication and/or mailing costs.
2If a "sliding scale'' approach is used in fixing attorney fees, the total award will be
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Consolidating the cases and appointing a committee of counsel to
represent the class avoids the troublesome problem of attempting to
select one or more class representatives from a group of equally quali-
fied representatives, each with eminently qualified counsel. If the cases
are eventually settled, the only drawback to the "consolidated class"
approach is that each member of the "committee of counsel" will prob-
ably expect a generous award of attorney fees, thereby reducing the
ultimate recovery by the absent class members. If the cases are litigated,
however, consolidation can cause problems for it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to conduct a trial by committee unless the committee has a
strong chairman who can serve as lead counsel.
Where some of the potential class actions have been transferred
under § 1407 an even more serious problem can occur if the cases actually
go to trial. Since each transferred case will at least theoretically be
returned to the transferor court at the completion of pretrial proceed-
ings, a consolidated class action will have to be dismantled prior to
remand or multiple class actions will have to be tried. As judge Myron
L. Gordon of the Eastern District of Wisconsin pointed out:
the avoidance of inconsistent adjudication with respect to class action
claims must necessarily involve choosing among competing represent-
atives or structuring complementary classes so as to avoid over-
lapping as much as possible."
Since the main reason for transferring related cases to a single district
under § 1407 "is to conserve judicial resources and avoid duplication
of effort, '29 consolidation of class actions should not be permitted unless
settlement is certain or all consolidated cases were originally filed in the
transferee court or transferred there for trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1404(a) or 1406(a).
In an attempt to allow all potential class representatives and their
attorneys to participate in the class action without reducing the effec-
tiveness of the class action technique or the benefits or transfer under
§ 1407, Judge Miles Lord selected one of the "farm cases" as the farm
class action and the attorney for the plaintiff as the attorney for the
class. However, all attorneys representing members of the class were
allowed to become members of a "committee of counsel" to assist the
counsel for the representative plaintiff.
Such a committee of counsel may serve a very worthwhile purpose.
With attorney fees averaging between ten and twenty per cent in large
consumer class actions, attorney fees will often be orders of magnitude
greater than any class member's final recovery. Thus it may be very
difficult for the attorney to view an offer of settlement objectively;
the committee of counsel, each of whom has a substantially smaller
pecuniary interest in the litigation, may provide more objectivity in
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assessing settlement offers. Such counsel will also be quick to discover
a conflict of interest within the designated class if one develops during
litigation or settlement negotiations. In this way a committee of counsel
may serve as an important "check and balance" in large consumer class
actions.
B. NOTICE IN CLASS ACTIONS
The methods for giving notice to absent members of the class has
also troubled many transferee judges, particularly in large consumer
class actions. The rules provide that in "(b) (3) classes" "the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. °3 0 Virtually all courts have inter-
preted this provision to mean that the court must prepare or at least
approve the notice and control its distribution. Even if the rules do not
make the court primarily responsible for giving notice in class actions,
its broad supervisory control over class actions and its duty to protect
the interests of the absent members of the class gives it not only the
authority, but the responsibility to insure that the class action notice
fairly and adequately describes the litigation and gives absent class
members a free and meaningful choice in determining whether or not
to opt out of the class. For this reason transferee judges generally
insist that they review and approve the notice before it is given to
the class.31
Many transferee judges have concluded that an official notice
from the court should be used rather than one emanating from the
class representative's attorney. As a result, class action notices are
either prepared by the judge himself or prepared by counsel for the
judge's signature. 32 Some judges have permitted notices to be mailed
in envelopes carrying a return adddress of the attorney for the class,
and have permitted inquiries concerning the suit to be made directly
to the attorney for the representative plaintiff. Most judges insist that
the class action notice be as neutral as possible and contain no reference
to counsel for either side. These judges generally require inquiries to
be made to the judge or to the clerk rather than to counsel. They also
require that responses to class action notices, either in the form of opt-
out notices or "proof of claims," be sent to the clerk of court rather
than to the attorney for the representative plaintiff.33
8FED. R. Civic P. 23(C)(2).
"The Manual and the local rules of many federal district courts prohibit any com-
munications with absent class members without prior authorization from the court.
See, Local 734 Bakery Drivers' Pension Fund Trust v. Continental Illinois National
Bank, 57 F.R.D. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
"Some judges prefer that the notice be signed by the clerk of court.
'1In many cases, due to lack of sufficient personnel, the clerk's office does not become
actually involved in either notice distribution or notice processing. In some cases, the
representative party has been required to obtain, at his expense, a post office box;
[Vol. 35
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More significantly the judge must determine whether the method
of notice suggested by the parties is "the best notice practicable under
the circumstances," the rule requires. A serious problem can occur if
the court determines that individual notice can and must be given to
class members by mail but the representative party is unable to bear
the costs of a large mailing.34
Several transferee judges have concluded that the court should
initially bear the costs of mailing class action notices.3 5 This conclusion
is derived from the language of Rule 23 which provides that the court,
rather than the representative party or his attorney, must "direct"
notice to absent class members. Many courts have authorized the use
of penalty envelopes for mailing of class action notices. The practice
has been ignored in small classes by those interested in court economics,
even where it was necessary for the clerk of court to obtain extra en-
velopes in order to make the required mailing. However, where the
notice was given to several million members-at a very great expense
to the federal government 36-- the propriety of using penalty-free en-
velopes was challenged by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts37 and by at least one congressman.38
and returns from the class action notices are sent to the clerk at the special post office
box rather than to the clerk's office. The "class attorney" is responsible for pro-
cessing responses to class action notices under the general supervision of the court.
3This problem generally does not arise in a settlement situation for there is a fund
out of which expenses for class action notices can be taken. Of course, where classes
are established soon after the actions are filed, there will be no settlement fund;
and someone--the representative party, the defendants, or the court-will have to
pay for the notice. Perhaps courts should inquire prior to establishment of a class
whether the representative party is financially able to pay for the expenses of an
extensive notice program. The ability to bear such a financial burden might be an
appropriate consideration in determining which of several competing class action
representatives should represent the class or whether it may be necessary to con-
solidate the "competing" class actions so that the various class representatives can
share the costs of an extensive notice program.
15It is generally assumed that such costs could later be "taxed" to the losing party.
However, if the plantiffs lose and the representative party cannot pay such costs, it
is doubtful that they could actually be collected from the class members.
"The cost of mailing class action notices in the nonsettling Antibiotic Drug Cases
was approximately $800,000, which is more than the annual Administrative Office
postage budget.
"The Administrative Office has recently prohibited federal judges from using penalty
envelopes for notices in class actions. While it is true that the language of FED. R.
Civic P. 23 concerning the court's responsibility for class action notices is far from
clear, it would seem that the interpretation of this rule, like the other Rules of Civil
Procedure, should be made by federal judges and not by administrative personnel.
If sufficient funds are not available, it would seem to be the responsibility of the
Administrative Office to try and get them. Of course, Congress undoubtedly has the
final authority and could prohibit the use of penalty envelopes for class action no-
tices. It is somewhat doubtful that the Administrative Office has similar authority.
The unavailability of penalty envelopes for class action notices has forced at
least one transferee court to postpone the giving of notice to members of the class.
In re Ampicillen Antitrust Litigation, supra note 20 at 280. A substantial delay in
notifying the class might seriously jeopardize the class action. See Scott v. Danaher,
343 F. Supp. 1272, 1278 (N.D. Inl. 1972) [three-judge court].
'Representative H. R. Gross of Iowa-ranking minority member of the House Post
Office & Civil Service Committee.
1974]
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Where individual notice cannot be given to class members by mail,
most courts have resorted to notice by publication, either in newspapers
of general circulation or in trade journals or sometimes both.3 9 The
class action notice given in the settling Antibiotic Drug Cases was pub-
lished in every newspaper of general circulation in each of the 42 settling
states at a cost of approximately $130,000.40 It is unfortunate that no
attempt was ever made to determine how many members of the class
received and understood the published iotice, even though a challenge
to the settlement on related grounds was rejected.41 The exact size of
the consumer classes in the settling Antibiotic Drug Cases is not known,
but it must have approached 100,000,000 members. However, only 37,000
class members filed notices of claims-approximately 0.05% of the
class. 42 Before notice by publication is used exclusively in other con-
sumer classes, it would seem that the parties should present the court
with some indication as to the effectiveness of such a notice.
43
A different procedure was used in the "litigating" Antibiotic Drug
Cases. Direct mail notice-supplemented by newspaper and television
publicity-was given to approximately 20,000,000 members of the class.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the impact of the two types
of notice, for the litigating class notice did not offer a double option,
but only the choice of opting out of the class or, by silence, becoming
81The Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlilse & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973)
disapproved of the initial assessment of the cost of publishing class action notices to
the defendants even though the lower court had held a preliminary hearing, as one
would be held prior to entering a temporary injunction, and found a high probability
of success that the class would prevail on the merits of the controversy. Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). This decision coupled
with the Administrative Office ruling that penalty envelopes may not be used for
class action notices may eventually destroy the ''class action '-at least as a device
to protect consumer rights.
'
0 State of West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 724-725 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). In The Protection Device Cases, actual notice was sent to 89,000 customers
of the defendants; and, in addition, a notice was published for three consecutive
weeks in both the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times. City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp., supra note 16 at 1384.
"In re Antibiotic Antitrust Action, 333 F. Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
"The notice in the consumer cases gave the absent class member o double option. He
could opt out of the class, or by silence, consent to be included in the class. In addi-
tion, he could file a notice of claim setting forth the amount of his claim; or he
could, again by silence, assign his claim to the attorney general of his state. Of
course, there is no way of knowing how many class members actually read and under-
stood the notice and then decided to, in effect, assign their claims to the state at-
torney general.
"If the dissemination of class action notices is determined to be a proper court func-
tion, then it may be that the court will have to have additional personnel, computer
services, mailing services, and other facilities for handling notices in large class actions.
It might be desirable to establish within either the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation or the Administrative Office of the United States Courts a class action
notice section, staffed by sufficient personnel and with adequate equipment to pro-
vide for giving, receiving, processing, and collating notices in class actions regard-
less of their magnitude.
If the court is responsible for giving notice by mail, as many courts have held,
it would seem that the court would also be responsible for giving notice by publi-
cation or by any other method. Thus, funds will have to be made available for pro-
curing advertisements in newspapers and trade magazines.
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a member of the class. In both groups of cases, very few people opted
out.
A variety of techniques were used for mailing notices in the liti-
gating case, ranging from a computer derived printout from the State
of North Carolina (which included everyone who was a voter or a tax
payer or had registered a motor vehicle with the State of North Caro-
lina) to an "occupant" mailing used in the State of California. A press
release, approved by the parties and the court, was released on the
day the notices were delivered. The primary purpose of this publicity
was to alert the public that they would be receiving an important notice
in the mail, that they were to read it carefully and seek competent
professional advice if necessary.
It is possible that the "best notice practicable" in a large consumer
class might be delivered by way of spot television announcements video-
taped by the judge himself. Television is, without doubt, one of the
most important ways of reaching the American public; it should be
used to a greater extent for giving notices in class actions.
C. SETTLEMENT AND ATTORNEY FEEs
Another difficult problem presently confronting transferee judges
is approving settlements and the awards of attorney fees in large class
actions. 44 During the past three years several very large settlements
were approved.45 Although the procedures employed by various trans-
feree judges may have differed from one another to some degree they
all reflected a careful assessment of the settlement. The Court's function
in approving settlements is:
"to determine whether the agreement reached between the parties
is fair and reasonable in light of the nature of the claims presented,
the defenses offered thereto, and the difficulty of proving the re-
spective allegations of the parties, the complexity of the issues
raised, and the parties' likelihood of success or failure in pressing
their respective claims or defenses. Another important consider-
ation is whether the defendants will be able to satisfy any judg-
ment rendered against them in the event of a full trial terminat-
ing favorably to the plaintiff.""
Although Rule 23 does not specifically give the trial judge the
authority to set or approve attorney fees in connection with class
"The importance of settlement of complex litigation transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(1970) was underscored by Judge Metzner who estimated that it would have taken
2,300 trial days-about 11 years-to try only damages in one group of the Protection
Device cases. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., supra note 16 at 1388-1389.
"Well over half of the Antibiotic Drug Cases have been settled. State of West Vir-
ginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., supra Note 36 aff'd 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971); Hart-
ford Hispital v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 52 R.F.D. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). So have most of
the Plumbing Fixture Cases. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Rad. &
Sanitary Corp., 322 F. Supp. 834, 323 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd 453 F.2d
30 (3d Cir. 1971) and the Children's Book Cases. State of Illinois v. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
"In re Revenue Properties Co., Ltd., supra note 23.
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action settlements, there is little doubt the power exists.47 Transferee
judges have generally rejected the "automatic" 25% contingent fee,
often suggested by plaintiff's attorneys as a standard, 48 and have based
fees on factors peculiar to the specific litigation. That each class action
must be viewed on its own merits is probably best exemplified by the
Plumbing Fixtures Case which involved different settlements for dif-
ferent class of plaintiffs. Judge Alexander Harvey of the District of
Maryland, used different percentages for setting attorney fees depend-
ing, in part, on the difficulty that the class action representatives had
in reaching settlement with the defendants. 49
Courts which have rejected the contingent fee formula have con-
sidered the following factors in fixing the amount to be awarded in
class action litigation: the novelty and difficulty of the questions in-
volved; the professional standing, reputation and experience of the
attorneys; the time, spent on the case; the diligence and skill exhibited,
and the actual benefits conferred upon members of the class. In the
Childdren's Book Cases, Judge Bernard NI. Decker of the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois noted that the attorneys representing a class of 3,000
public school and public libraries-none of which had sufficient pur-
chases to justify litigation-had obtained "excellent financial results
for the class members" by aggressively prosecuting their cases and
convincing the defendants-one by one-that there would most cer-
tainly be a trial if adequate settlements were not made.5 0 Settlement
was made with the various defendants in two phases. The first took
from October, 1968, to March, 1971, and resulted in a settlement fund
of $3,461,628 plus interest. The attorneys requested and received a 20%
fee which totaled $662,000. The second phase took another year and
produced a settlement fund of $3,213,287 plus interest. Again the class
attorney requested a 20% fee ($665,000) but the court, after considering
all of the factors mentioned above,5 ' approved a fee of $475,000 for
services rendered in' achieving the second settlement.52 The total fee
of slightly over $1,000,000 may seem large, but this litigation resulted
'
7FED. R. Crvm P. 23(e) provides that a class action "shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court." This power necessarily includes the
power to approve attorney fees and costs, at least where they affect the amount of
the settlement which will eventually be actually distributed to the class.
4sJudge Metzner called the 25% formula "nonexistent" in his opinion. City of Detroit
v. Grinnell Corp., supra note 16 at 1390.
"See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc., v. Am. Rad. & Std. Sanitary Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1077
(E.D. Pa. 1972). For example, a fee of 15% of the $1,000,000 wholesaler class was
allowed while a 25% fee in the $2,000,0000 plumbing contractor settlement was auth-
orized for distribution among the 16 plaintiffs' attorneys who contributed to the
creation of the settlement fund.510 ne defendant refused to settle before trial but capitulated on the second day of
trial, increasing its settlement from $115,000 to $525,000.
"Of particular significance was the fact that the attorneys spent a total of 8,633 hours
on the first settlement and only 3,975 hours on the second settlement.
"In re Children's Books, 55 F.R.D. 221 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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in a net recovery to the plaintiffs of more than five and one-half mil-
lion dollars.53
Although the "small" settlements in the Plumbing Fixture Cases
produced relatively few problems with regard to attorney fees and
costs, 4 the $26,000,000 settlement 55 of the owner-builder class created
a variety of problems for the transferee judge. Judge Harvey approved
expenses of the settlement committee of more than $220,000 and ex-
penses of various other attorneys totaling approximately $100,000. The
real problem concerned the award of attorney fees. The two "class
attorneys" sought a $3,000,000 fee while twelve other attorneys sought
an aggregate fee of more than $1,000,000. Since all twelve attorneys
had contingent fee contracts with some members of the "owner-builder"
class (or other parties in this litigation) and since all were reimbursed
for their out-of-pocket expenses,56 the court declined to award any
of them an additional fee to be deducted from the settlement fund.
To establish a proper fee for the attorneys for the owner-builder
class, the class was subdivided into four categories:
1. The claims of class members personally represented by the
attorneys for the class (18.2% of the entire class) ;
2. The claims of class members personally represented by other
attorneys who allegedly contributed to the creation of the settle-
ment fund. (37.6% of the entire class);
3. The claims of class members personally represented by still
other attorneys who allegedly did not contribute to the creation of
the settlement fund. (17.4% of the entire class) ; and
4. The claims of the "absent" class members. (26.8% of the entire
class).
The class attorneys sought no award of fees from category 15T and
category 2 claimants. They requested 162/3% of the amounts to be dis-
tributed to category 3 claimants58 and 331/3% of the amounts to be
distributed to the category 4 claimants. However, Judge Harvey re-
fused to authorize the assessment of additional attorney fees to category
3 claimants holding that "those claimants who undertook to incur the
risk of litigation should not be penalized by being required to pay for
53A $1,500,000 fee was awarded in three Protection Device national class actions which
were settled for $10,000,000. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., supra note 16 at 1392.
"'See note 43, supra.
'The fund consists of $21,500.000 from the "full line" settling defendants, $1,400,000
from the "short line' settling defendants and interest in excess of $3,000,000.
Only one attorney was given less than he requested.
5Pursuant to their private contingent fee arrangements, generally 33 1/3%, the class
attorneys will receive fees of more than $800,000 from their own clients.




McDermott: The Transferee Judge--The Unsung Hero Of MultiDistrict Litigation
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1974
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
larger attorneys fees than any other claimant 9 merely because their
attorneys may not have, in the opinion of counsel for the Class Represent-
atives, contributed as much to the creation of the settlement fund as
did others." 60
Several "absent" class members objected to the allowance of any
fees to the class attorneys from the settlement fund because these
attorneys would be adequately compensated by their own (category 1)
clients. The court rejected the contention: "the non-litigating (cate-
gory 4) claimants, in accepting their share of the benefits produced,
should likewise assume a share of the burden." 61 Recognizing that the
class attorneys were "entitled to fair and adequate compensation for
their skillful efforts in producing the sizable fund for the benefit of
this large class,6 2 the court awarded a fee of 20% of the nearly seven
million dollars distributable to category 4 claimants. This fee, approxi-
mately $1,375,000 was in addition to the $800,000 received by those
attorneys from their own clients. 63 The court rejected counsel's argu-
ment that an assessment of less than 331/3% unfairly discriminated
against the litigating claimants (categories 1, 2 and 3) and favored the
non-litigating (category 4) claimants. Judge Harvey observed that
the only way he could equalize the portion of the fee assessable to
the absent class members without allowing the total fee to become
excessive would be to reduce the contingent fees payable under the
agreements between counsel and their clients, the "litigating" members
of the class. Judge Harvey doubted that he had the power to consider
the reasonableness of private agreements between a client and his attor-
ney, particularly in view of the fact that none of the clients had re-
quested the court to review the reasonableness of the contingent fees.
He emphasized: "the test for determining what is a proper contingent
fee to be charged a private client is entirely different from the test for
determining what is a reasonable fee for class representation in a class
action settlement. '64
It is now generally agreed that before an award of attorney fees
or costs is made in class action litigation, the court should insist:
1. That the attorneys for the class file a detailed statement fully
setting forth the nature and complexity of the litigation, the results
achieved, the services performed by each attorney involved and
wSome category 3 class members would have had to turn over half of their recovery
to attorneys-33 1/3% to their retained attorneys and 16 2/3% to the attorneys
for the class.
®Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc., v. Am. Rad. & Std. Sanitary Corp., supra note 43 at 1086.
6Id. at 1087.
1Id. at 1089.
OThe court noted that a higher percentage would produce an hourly rate for the more
than 6,000 hours spent by the two attorneys on this litigation which "in spite of the
excellent result achieved and the undisputed competence of counsel ... would be
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the number of hours expended by all attorneys and the work actually
performed by each;
2. That all participating attorneys disclose any fee arrangement
they have made with any other attorney. If any other attorney
is to receive any part of the fee, the reason therefor should be fully
detailed and the services actually performed by other counsel
should be explained in full ;65
3. That any attorney seeking a fee for representing the class who
has entered into a contingent fee arrangement with his client should
disclose the details of the arrangement to the court;
4. That the attorneys submit a full and detailed itemization of all
expenses and costs which are to be reimbursed from the settlement
fund.
Within the organized bar opposition has recently grown to the
increased use of class actions, particularly in consumer cases. The
critics contend that class actions are being used to primarily benefit the
attorneys for the class and not class members themselves. Transferee
judges, however, have taken great pains to insure that the settlements6
themselves and any attorneys' fees awarded are fair. 7
Discovery
Discovery has undoubtedly become the most crucial problem facing
transferee judges in multidistrict litigation. Judge Phillip Neville of
the District of Minnesota has reported some rather revealing statistics
concerning the extent of discovery in the IBM litigation. The attorneys
for IBM had looked at more than 80 million documents taken from
65See generally, Setting Attorney Fees, by Judge Alaxander Harvey, District of Mary-
land, Remarks delivered at Fourth Transferee Judge Meeting, Chandler, Arizona,
December 6, 1971.
'The attorney for a group of plaintiffs in the Antibiotic Drug Cases requested court
approval of a $2,000,000 fee, payable by the defendants, for his role in negotiating
the eventual settlement of a major part of this litigation. Judge Wyatt observed that
a procedure which permits an attorney to negotiate an agreement by which defendants
would pay his fee while at the same time negotiating a settlement between the de-
fendants and the class he represented seemed "wrong in principle and ought to be
discouraged." The court decided not to nullify the fee arrangement primarily be-
cause there was no secrecy (a full disclosure had been made to the court and to
other counsel) and because payment by defendants would not diminish any recovery
by members of the class. The court reviewed counsel's participation in the litigation
and determined that a fair and reasonable value of his services was $600,000. How.
ever, the court pointed out that a payment of $600,000 by the defendants, in addition
to the 5361,000 already paid by his clients would be excessive, but Judge Wyatt per-
mitted the attorney to resolve this dilemma himself. Judge Wyatt also criticized
the procedure of intervening individual class members as named parties, apparently
for the purpose of establishing a contingent fee arrangement between the individual
class mmbers and their attorneys-an arrangement which may not be subject to
court approval. City of Philadelphia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 454
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
'
7See, In re Auto Pollution Antitrust Litigation, 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1970); City
of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., supra note 16; Hartford Hospital v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
supra note 40; Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971).
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the files of Control Data Corporation. Not to be out done, Control Data
and other plaintiffs sent 61 attorneys to suburban New York City to
look over documents and records at the IBM headquarters there. At
one point counsel for IBM announced that they want to take at least
2,700 depositions-one for each of the 2,700 companies in the computer
field."" Overly expensive and unnecessarily time-consuming discovery
has been reported by judges in almost every type of litigation being
processed and transferred under § 1407.69 One has no way of know-
ing if the new liberal rules of discovery encourage massive dis-
covery programs or if the attorneys involved in these types of cases
are attempting to wear down their opponents and seek favorable settle-
ments through the use of massive discovery. Sometimes it seems that
they are merely searching, perhaps in vain, for the one document which
will establish their claim or seriously weaken their opponent's. What-
ever the cause, there seems to be a growing concern that discovery in
complex litigation is getting out of hand.
Several transferee judges have attempted to limit the discovery
being conducted in their cases. Perhaps the best way to avoid un-
warranted discovery is for the transferee judge to exercise firm control
over discovery and to rule promptly on all objections so that the filing
of unnecessary discovery motions or frivolous objections cannot be used
as a delaying tactic. Another effective approach is to set a firm but
realistic trial date which will permit the parties to conduct a reasonable
amount of discovery but which will require them to limit the discovery
to the essentials. Of course, the judge must make sure that the date
is reasonable and must continually assist the parties and their attorneys
to be sure they will be ready when the trial date arrives. There is al-
ways a risk that by setting a firm date and refusing to depart from it,
the Court may unnecessarily and improperly limit discovery thereby
committing reversible error. However, one court has recently stressed
that "reversible error arising from curtailment of discover procedures
must be premised on a demonstration that the Court's action made it
impossible to obtain crucial evidence, and implicit in such a showing is
proof that more diligent discovery was impossible. 70
"One way of injecting the advisorial process into the approval of attorney fees and
costs would be to prohibit the deduction of attorney fees and costs from the pro-
posed settlement fund. The court would simply refuse to approve settlements unless
they clearly established the amount of distributable directly to the class. Attorney
fees and costs would then be an additional "price" to be paid for settling the cases.
The defendants would then have an interest in minimizing attorney fees and costs and
would turn hearings on the approval of attorney fees, now in essence an ex parte
proceeding, into an advisorial one. The judge would no longer be the sole protector
of the absent class.
69a In another group of antitrust cases, one deposition took 3,000 pages for its answer.
The documents produced by the defendants filled some 260 filing drawers and open
sheles. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., supra not 16 at 1386.
6One transferee judge, in observing the breadth of discovery being conducted in his
group of air disaster cases, commented that the parties would undoubtedly have taken
the depositions of Orville and Wilbur Wright if they were still alive.
"Eli Lilly &Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 462 F.2d 1096, 1105 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Another possible approach is to punish a party or its attorney for
unnecessary discovery by imposing sanctions under the federal rules3 1
Since this can only be done when the trial has been completed, its
effect is at best indirect.7 2 However, greater use of sanctions by trans-
feree judges in appropriate situations would undoubtedly curtail some
of the unnecessary discovery presently being conducted.
Independent or "Neutral" Experts
The Manual for Complex Litigation suggests that under certain cir-
cumstances a trial court should consider the employment of its own
experts.73 Two transferee judges have made extensive use of court-
appointed experts in two entirely different ways.
In the Kaehni Patent Litigation, Chief Judge Northrup of the Dis-
trict of Maryland appointed a technical expert to assist him. The tech-
nical nature of this patent infringement litigation led Judge Northrup
to suggest and the parties to agree that a neutral Court-appointed expert
witness be retained with the losing party paying the expense.7 4 The
procedure employed by Judge Northrup required agreement by all
parties in the selection of the expert to insure his neutrality. The expert
was to be present during the entire trial, but was permitted to conduct
out-of-court experiments if he thought they were necessary. He testi-
fied at the end of trial and was subject to examination by the parties
and by the court. Judge Northrup stressed that he did not consult with
his Court-appointed expert off the record at any time and did not con-
sider himself bound by the expert's opinion. The judge concluded that
in view of the complex nature of the litigation, which like most patent
infringement litigation was a "battle between experts", the use of an
independent or neutral technical expert was very beneficial.
While Judge Northrup's expert was appointed as an expert witness,
the experts utilized by Judge Miles Lord of the District of Minnesota in
nIFED. R. CIvic P. 37.
"Following trial in the Kaehni Patent Infringement Litigation, Chief Judge Northrup
entertained defendants' motion for costs and attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285
(1970). After carefully reviewing the entire course of the litigation, Judge Northrup
concluded that "plaintiffs' conduct throughout the entire history of this case [could]
only be characterized as vexatious and wholly unjustified in light of their lack of
candor [in answering interrogatories and requests for admissions] and failure to
conduct tests and discover the absence of infringement." The court granted de-
fendant's motion and held that the defendant was entitled to reimbursement for all
of its reasonable costs and attorney fees. The court also held, alternatively, that
attorney fees and costs could be assessed under FED. R. CivIL P. 37(c) because of
plaintiff's 'irresponsible and inexcusable'' failure to admit the matters contained
in defendants' second request for admission. Kaehni v. The Diffraction Co., Inc.,
(D. Md. memorandum and order of April 28, 1972).
7Manual, § 2.60(g). See also FED. R. CIVIc P. 83.
7
'This procedure was first employed two decades ago in patent litigation involving
complex technical questions by the late Judge William, C. Coleman of the District of
Maryland. Judge Coleman's technique was published in 21 F.R.D. 548 (1958) and
was incorporated into the "Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of
Protracted Cases" 25 F.R.D. 351 at 421 (1960).
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the Antibiotic Drug Cases were to serve as court advisors and it was not
originally anticipated that they would testify at trial. In his order
appointing an economist and a statistician, Judge Lord pointed out that
the parties had presented divergent positions with respect to the econ-
omic theories and statistical methods which were used in analyzing
and evaluating damages. These two experts were authorized "to consult
with the court, its representatives and, subject to objection by the
parties, the employees, representatives and experts of the plaintiff and
defendants as they shall deem necessary. '7 5
These Court-appointed experts reviewed the technical material sub-
mitted by the parties and assisted the transferee judge in much the
same way a law clerk would. They also acted as the court's represent-
ative in off-the-record meetings among the experts representing all of
the parties. The purpose of these informal meetings was to make all
parties aware of the economic evidence which would be offered by
each side and to permit objections to such evidence to be made early
enough so that the parties could reconcile their technical differences.
Judge Lord felt that the use of these experts was of great value and
assisted the court in reaching a better understanding of the technical
issues involved.
Judge Lord also found it necessary to appoint special masters to
assist him in the review of hundreds of documents for which the defend-
ants claimed privilege. These masters were "impartial attorneys of high
esteem in the community, ' 76 who conducted an exhaustive review of
the documents. They eventually made findings which were accepted
by the trial court.77
The use of special masters, expert witness, and technical advisors
is not only desirable in some complex multidistrict litigation, but
absolutely essential if the judge is to properly discharge his respon-
sibility under § 1407. Many of the parties have almost unlimited re-
sources at their disposal and may employ teams of "experts" to assist
them. It is unrealistic to expect a single federal judge to efficiently
process such complex litigation without qualified assistance.
Resolution of Common Issues
Although both the language7 8 and the legislative history 9 of § 1407
clearly contemplate that all cases, except those which are terminated
"In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions (S.D.N.Y.
Administrative Order No. 71-2).
WIn re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions (S.D.N.Y.
Administrative Order No. 71-13).
"Although certain of these findings were found to be erroneous by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, that Court did not criticize the appointment or use of the masters.
Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545 (Sth Cir. 1972).
1. . . Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the
conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred
unless it shall have been previously treminated .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1970).
'" Slubsection (a) requires that transferred cases be remanded to the originating
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during pretrial, are to be remanded to the transferor courts at the
close of pretrial proceedings, few cases have been remanded for trial.
Most multidistrict litigation, like other federal civil litigation, ends in
a settlement. But even where no settlement has been reached, remand
to the transferor courts, except for determination of individual issues
such as damages, has been exceedingly rare. Most transferee judges
have concluded that common issues should be resolved by them prior to
remand and they have employed various techniques to accomplish this. 0
One way of avoiding remand for trial is to dispose of some or all
of the major issues by summary judgment. If extensive discovery has
taken place and a complete pretrial record has been prepared, the trans-
feree court may be able to settle liability of some if not all of the defend-
ants by entertaining motions for partial summary judgment prior to
remand. Such a procedure is consistent with § 1407 as the legislative
history makes it clear that the transferee court has the power to rule
on motions for summary judgment.81 This procedure was employed by
Judge Mac Swinford of the Eastern District of Kentucky in the Cin-
cinnati (TWA) Air Disaster Cases. 2
Following completion of an extensive three-year discovery program,
the parties were invited to file motions for partial summary judgment
on the issue of liability. Motions were filed by three of the four defend-
ants and by the passenger pjaintiffs. The court absolved three of the
defendants from liability for the accident and held that the passenger
plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment against the carrier.8 3 The court
pointed out that three years of discovery had failed to produce any
direct evidence to support the carrier's contention that the crash was
district at the close of coordinated pretrial proceedings. The Bill (S. 159, 90th Cong..
1st Sess. (1967)) does not, therefore, include the trial of cases in the consolidated
proceedings. The experience of the Coordinating Committee was limited to pretrial
matters, and the [House Judiciary] Committee consequently considers it desirable to
keep this legislative proposal within the confines of that experience. Additionally, trial
in the originating district is generally preferable from the standpoint of the parties
and witnesses, and from the standpoint of the courts it may be impracticable to
have all cases in mass litigation tried in one district."
8*H. R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968) which accompanied S. 159, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
For a criticism of some of these techniques, see Comment, The Experience of
Transferee Courts under the Multidistriot Litigation Act, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 588,
607-611 (1972).
1H. R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968).
'2Reidinger v. Trans World Airlines, 329 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Ky. 1971).
8The stipulated facts were that the TWA Flight No. 128 was cleared to land at the
Greater Cincinnati Airport; that the crew attempted to make a visual approach; that
the required "minimum level altitude" call-out was not made by the first officer;
and that Flight No. 128 descended below its minimum level altitude well in advance
of a visual sighting of the runway and contacted small trees at an elevation of 875
feet, almost two miles short of the runway. The court posed the "fundamental issue"
as whether the crew knew or should have known their altitude, speed, and rate of
descent prior to the crash or whether the crew, becaus of instrument failure or
dereliction of duty by tower controllers, had reason to believe that they were exe-
cuting their landing from a safe approach altitude and at a safe speed.
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"proximately" caused by an instrument malfunction.34 After exonerat-
ing the other defendants, the Court concluded that the undisputed facts
established that the flight crew was negligent in the performance of
their duties; the carrier was held liable for the accident. 5
Although recognizing "the great contribution made by Swinford in
these complex cases," the Court of Appeals reversed. It concluded that
the grant of summary judgment had occasioned "the denial of the
opportunity afforded by our adversary system to put opposing factual
contentions against each other to determine truth."8 6 What the Court
of Appeals overlooked was that all discovery regarding liability had
been completed and that Judge Swinford reviewed all of the depositions
and documentary evidence which had been produced during three years
of discovery. Based on his review of these materials Judge Swinford
concluded that there was absolutely no evidence to support TWA's con-
tentions. TWA had a "theory" as to the cause of the crash, but in three
years it had produced no facts to support its theory. 7 In spite of the
appellate court's decision in this case, it seems reasonably certain that
liability can be resolved by summary judgment in appropriate cases.88
A test case may also be used for resolving common issues prior to
remand. The transferee judge, with the assistance of counsel, selects
one or more of the cases originally filed in his district (or transferred
there for all purposes under § 1404(a)) and conducts a bifurcated trial
on the issue of liability, lie may also invite the parties in other cases
to enter into a joint stipulation agreeing to be bound by his decision
and by the decision on appeal.8 9 Even in the absence of such a stipu-
lation, a decision on the merits will likely have a profound influence
on the remaining cases, often resulting in a quick settlement.90 Addi-
14TWA theorized that the amount of precipitation in the air and the icing propensities
of the precipitation at the aircraft's altitude might have resulted in the ingestion and
freezing of moisture in the pitot and static pressure tubes of the aircraft which, in
turn, might have caused the altimeters to misfunction. The court characterized this
contention as "totally hypothetical" since it was based on double and triple in-
ferences. It was stipulated that at the time of the crash, the altimeter readings
corresponding almost exactly with the plane's altitude at he time it first hit the trees.
'
5The crew's negligence was traced to their failure to perform two fundamental and
highly important functions: the first officer's failure to make the necessary call-outs
of the aircraft's rate of descent, airspeed, and, most importantly. altitude and the
crew's failure to execute a missed approach when they reached the minimum altitude
without being able to see the runway.
8Reidinger v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 463 F.2d 1017, 1921 (6th Cir. 1972).
'"If Judge Swinford had entered an order precluding the introduction of any evidence
which had not been made part of the record during the three-year discovery period,
it might have been shown that there was and could be no evidence to support TWA's
contention.
"See, for example, Dolgow v. Anderson, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972).
NThis was done in the Contact Lens Patent Litigation. There, 98 patent infringement
actions originally filed in 42 different districts were transferred to the Northern
District of Illinois and assigned to Judge Hubert Will. The common plaintiffs and
almost half of the defendants entered into such a stipulation. Butterfield v. Oculus
Contact Lens Co., 332 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
"In re Air Crash Disaster, Dayton, Ohio, 350 F. Supp. 7 7, 760 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
[Vol. 35
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tionally, unless "mutuality" is required, a common party may be bound
by an unfavorable decision under the doctrines of res judicata or col-
lateral estoppel."
Perhaps the most innovative and controversial method of disposing
of common issues without remand is by transfer under § 1404(a). Con-
solidation for trial through transfer under § 1404(a) predates the pas-
sage of the Multidistriet Litigation Act; air disaster cases, for example,
were often consolidated in a single court by the independent action of
the judges before whom the cases were originally filed. The Panel
has emphasized that §§ 1407 and 1404(a) are not mutually exclusive
and that the same group of cases might involve both types of transfers.92
Transfer under § 1404 (a) can either precede or follow transfer under
§ 1407. Although it has been urged "that only the transferor court
can rule on a § 1404(a) transfer motion, '93 every court considering
this question has held that the power to transfer resides with the
transferee court. The defendants in the Antibiotic Drug Cases chal-
lenged the authority of a transferee judge to make further transfers
under § 1404(a), but Judge Miles Lord concluded that he had the power
to make the proposed transfer. After he transferred one group of cases
from the Southern District of New York to the District of Minnesota for
trial, 94 the defendants sought review by writ of mandamus on the
ground that the transferee judge lacked the power to make a further
transfer under § 140 4 (a). The Court of Appeals denied the motion,
upholding the power of the transferee court to make the order and
finding no abuse of discretion. The court recognized that "while the
Multidistrict Litigation Panel would have no power to transfer these
cases for trial under § 1404 (a), the judge to whom the cases have
been assigned has such power here as he would in any other case."9 5
A variation to this theme occurred in the Hanover, New Hampshire
OChief Judge Carl Weinman of the Southern District of Ohio applied federal rather
than state law to determine the preclusive effect to be given a federal court judgment
in diversity actions upon another federal action involving the same issues. Chief
Judge Weinman then concluded that even parties who did not participate in the trial
of the initial case would be bound by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. This de-
cision, which may be said to have developed the "Humphrey's correlary" to the
well-known Bernhard Doctrine (Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122
P.2d 892 (1942), means that the sword of the Bernhard Doctrine cuts both ways.
It may be used to grant summary judgment in favor of a nonparticipating plaintiff
against a common defendant who has litigated the issue of liability and lost as well
as to grant summary judgment against a nonparticipating plaintiff and in favor of
a common defendant who has litigated the issue of liability and won. In re Air
Crash Disaster, Dayton, Ohio, supra note 90 at 767.
"In the Air Crash Disaster at Ardmore, Okla., 295 F. Supp. 45 (J.P.M.L. 1968), seven
cases were transferred to the Eastern District of Oklahoma by the Judicial Panel while
nine actions were transferred from four different districts under 28 U.S.C. § 1404
(1964).
"'Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation in the Federal Courts, 38 FORDBAM L. REV.
786 (1970).
9 In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
"Pfizer v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971), accord, Greyhound Computer Corp. v.
I.B.M., 342 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Minn. 1972).
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Air Disaster Litigation which had been transferred under § 1407 to the
District of New Hampshire and assigned to Judge Hugh H. Bownes.9 6
The parties in those cases did not seriously question the transferee
judge's authority to make a further transfer under § 1404(a) but dis-
agreed about whether the transfer should be for a trial limited to
liability or for trial of both liability and damages.9 7 The court decided
that the best way to proceed was to determine the issue of liability first
in a consolidated trial and then to have separate trials on damages.
Judge Bownes felt that the judge who supervised the pretrial discovery
was better prepared to preside at the liability trial than a transferor
judge would be but that the convenience of the plaintiffs would be best
served by having the damage portion of the trial conducted where they
brought suit, since the witnesses who would testify on the issue of dam-
ages were different from the witnesses who would testify on the issue
of liability. While he had no doubt that a New Hampshire jury would
be quite competent to determine liability in all cases, he was concerned
that the difference in their backgrounds as compared to jurors in New
York City, Philadelphia or Ohio might have the effect of depriving
the plaintiffs of their constitutionally-guaranteed right to a trial by
jury of their peers. Thus, the court transferred all cases to the District
of New Hampshire for a consolidated trial on the issue of liability but
provided that they would all be remanded or retransferred to the re-
spective transferor courts for separate trials on the damage issue.9 8
Other transferee judges in aviation litigation have made § 1404(a) trans-
fers for trial on all issues, damages as well as liability.99
These transferee judges, faced with the possibility of remanding
large groups of cases to various districts for multiple determinations of
common questions of law, each employed different techniques to insure
that a single decision on the common issue would be made fairly and
expeditiously.
CONCLUSION
Much has been written about the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation and its immense contribution to the orderly processing of
complex federal litigation. Were it not for the Panel, 43 federal district
judges might have been involved in the processing of the Butterfield
Patent Litigation, 39 more in the Antibiotic Drug Litigation and another
"In re Air Crash Disaster near Hanover, N.H., 314 F. Supp. 62 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
"The defendants objected to the transfer for trial on issue of liability alone, but
strongly supported transfer of all cases for trial as to liability and damages. Most
plaintiffs, on the other hand, did not object to a transfer for trial on the issue of
liability, although some objected to a transfer for all purposes.
"In re Hanover, New Hampshire, Air Crash Litigation, supra note 21. The cases
were never tried, however; all remaining cases were settled at the commencement of
the consolidated trial.
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38 in the Plumbing Fixture Litigation. Under the aegis of the Panel
these cases were assigned to five federal judges leaving 115 other judges
free to handle the other equally important business of the federal courts.
But it was these five men-and the other federal judges who have
assumed the responsibility of other major multidistrict litigation, who
have made the system work. They have borne the burdens of this mas-
sive and complex litigation-and borne it exceedingly well.
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